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I have chosen this subject first, because present interest
in political questions, due largely to actual world conditions,
is more than ordinarily intense; again because the citizens
of any democracy' will be able to render more enlightened
public service and reach a better appreciation of the liberties
they enjoy if they understand those broad, underlying and
unchangeable principles on which the structure of their gov-
ernment rests and, finally, because the dangers which hreat-.
en the stability of our present form of government by rival
philosophies of life are neither so remote nor so insignificant
as to make a warning against them superfluous. The subject
is obviously a broad one, one that could better be treated in
several volumes than in a brief article. Here we can do little
more than draw the rough outlines.
There are various possible approaches to our subject. One
might, for instance, undertake simply to give a historical
sketch of all political theories coming under the heading of
democratic, beginning as far back as Aristotle and coming
on down to the present time. Well, history no doubt has its
value. I should be the last to try to minimize it, but to select
the historical approach in an article as brief as this must be,
seems to me as incongruous as for the Sunday preacher
to begin his sermon on charity back in the Garden of Eden.
When that happens the congregation groan inwardly, settle
back in their pews and prepare for the worst.
Again we might approach it from the controversial angle
and try to show that this individual or that, one group and
not another, deserves the credit for originating the idea of
democracy in Government. But one drawback to that meth-
od is that once you start to locate the birth-place of an idea,
and then to bestow credit where credit belongs for its devel-
opment and. application, you find yourself chasing down the
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long avenues of history till the dawn of time, and meeting
so many different peoples who insist that it is their brain
child that your search will be endless, and so partly fruitless.
This much at least is beyond serious controversy: (1) that
the idea of democracy - abstracting from its many forms
and degrees - is not a purely modern invention at all;
(2) that it found in the Christian view of life and of man
one of its most sympathetic allies, and (3) that if it is going
to survive the onslaughts of the contemporary epidemic of
state absolutism sweeping over large areas of the Western
World, its friends had better be mounting the watch-towers,
strengthening their out-posts and equipping their fortress
for a long seige.
The approach I have actually chosen is the philosophical
approach. It is, as you know, in the preamble to the Declara-
tion of Independen, e of 1776 that we find stated in sum-
mary form the principles of our American Political Philoso-
phy. It was the founders' justification before the world for
what they had done, that is, their rebellion against the
mother country, and- what they intended to do for the new
and independent government which they set up. "A decent
respect," they said, "to the opinion of mankind requires that
they should declare the causes which impel them to separa-
tion." These "causes," or the ultimate rational grounds or
principles upon which they took their stand, involve an at-
titude, a settled conviction toward the origin and the nature
and the destiny of the world and of man, which is precisely
what is connoted by the term philosophy. I shall consider
this philosophy under four headings: (1) The political
equality and freedom of all men; (2) sovereignty resides
in the people; (3) a people has the right to select its rulers
and (4) they have the complementary right, when abuses
are extremely grave, to revolt against an existing govern-
ment and set up another in its place.
Now, a philosophical argument, like any other, must take
as its starting point something that is either commonly ad-
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mitted as true, or which is immediately evident and beyond
dispute. Otherwise, the contestants will never get on com-
mon ground; they will neither listen to one another, nor
ever be able to reach a conclusion. So we find the authors
of the Declaration of Independence beginning by saying:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident: (1) that all men
are created equal, (2) that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain inalienable rights, and (3) that among these
rights are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. .. ."
Strictly speaking, of course, none of these assertions is self-
evident, such as the proposition, twice two are four. But,
at the time, all were so widely accepted, in theory at least,
that the writer felt that no one would call them in question.
Moreover, they are so easily proved that it is no exaggera-
tion to call them quasi self-evident. At any rate, our found-
ers confidently placed the'origin of the world and of men
in the creative act of God, and held that because that is so,
every man is the equal of every other, that is, he has the
same essential attributes, the same intrinsic dignity and
worth, the same essential needs, the same final destiny. Fur-
ther, being a creature of God, they held that he is necessarily
subject to the Divine Will or law; and since that law is
made known in the mind of each individual, it is grounded
in human nature, and so aptly called the natural law. Again,
since the inevitable effect of law is to impose duties on some
with correlative rights in others, it follows that if the law is
bound up with their nature, the rights flowing from that law
will be as inalienable as the nature itself. Finally, since men
were created to live, their first natural duty obviously is to
live, and so to seek the end of life in which ultimately hap-
piness will be found, and to seek it in a manner consonant
with their nature, that is, freely. If then these are their
primary and absolute duties, it follows necessarily that to
them must correspond unconditional rights,- the inalien-
able rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
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The first and most fundamental truth then upon which
our American conception of government rests is the Father-
hood of God. The first conclusion drawn from it is that all
men are brothers, that is, all are co-equal members of the
human family, have the same natural status and dignity and
destiny, and so also the same basic rights and duties, i. e.,
the right and the duty to live, and to pursue the true end of
life freely, which is liberty.
This much is abundantly clear. What is not so clear to
many is what is meant by the natural law. At a recent con-
ference on social studies a prominent university professor
qualified it as "unmitigated bunk." That view is not uncom-
mon. Were it true, then of course all talk of natural or
inalienable rights would also be unmitigated bunk, as would
also the whole philosophical foundation of our popular gov-
ernment. It is demonstrable, however, that without the
recognition of the natural moral law popular government,
as set forth by our founders is impossible. What then is the
natural law?
Law, as everybody knows, is a rule of action, a guide or
norm to which action either must or ought to conform, so
that order and justice may prevail. We say also that law
is for the common welfare, the common good. But that is
true only because without order, without codrdination of
effort and the subordination of the individual to the com-
mon end, there could be no common end or good. Law then
is for order. But as there is a twofold order, so there is a two-
fold law. There is the physical order, the order of inanimate
and non-free beings, and there is the moral order, the order
of free beings. To nature we must add human nature. Though
both are parts of the same whole, they do not act in the
same way, they do not observe the law of their being in the
same way. Now it is curious that while nobody objects to
the term natural law in the sense of physical law, such, e. g.,
as the law of gravitation, many hold that it has no sense
when applied to men or moral beings. And yet there is the
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same evidence for it in the one case as in the other. It is. a
natural law in the physical world that one body attracts
another inversely according to the square of the distance
which separates them. No scientist made this law. One of
them merely discovered it. He discovered a constant. and
uniform way of acting, of action and reaction, in physical
bodies. Now the determination of the respective natures of
things by reason of which they act in this constant and uni-
form manner is the law in things and in brufe animals. The
scientists's verbal statement, his formula, is but a descrip-
tion of it. But the law exists quite .independently of the de-
scription.
So too, when we talk about animal instinct we are speak-
ing of a constant and uniform way of acting which is, so to
say, ingrained in their very natures. We say it is natural
for the ants to live in colonies and for the spider to spin its
web. What we mean is, that given their respective natures,
their modes of living and of acting are determined for them,
- as is indeed the whole order of their lives. That determina-
tion is what we mean by the natural law in the physic.al sense.
It is a rule of action woven into the very structure of their
organisms. It enables them to.adjust themselves advantage-
ously to both their friends and enemies, to what is good and
what is harmful to them, in a word, to seek those ends which
will minister to their conservation and full development as
individuals, and to the continuation of their species.
Now since man also is part of nature, of the cosmic order
of things, we should not hesitate to claim that he too is a
subject of and guided by natural law. Only, not in the same
way as non-free agents. The price we must pay for our free-
dom is the necessity of constructing a moral order for our
lives. Animals need no education, no training. They act for
ends, but without consciousness of end. Hence the whole
order of their lives is fixed for them. For them there is ques-
tion neither of right or wrong, nor of rights and duties. But
we are not born with a knowledge of life and how it should
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be lived. We must acquire it by intellectual effort. We must
learn the meaning of life, discover standards of right and
wrong, formulate rules of right conduct, else, unlike the
animal, we blunder and injure or even destroy ourselves.
What is our starting point? Evidently it is not the State.
In time and in nature man is prior to the State. One is a
man before he is a citizen. And even becoming a citizen does
not deprive him of his status as an individual. The service
of society is not our highest destiny. No, our starting point
is ourselves. The roots of the moral order are in our moral
nature, i. e. in our intelligence and our will. We come to
know what life is for by finding out what are our basic or
essential needs and capacities. Our experience shows us that
we have need of truth and of goodness, and of beauty, not
merely in the abstract, and not merely of what is finite. The
fact is that we can know the infinite; we can know God, and
we have a felt need of Him. What else does this mean except
that we are made for Him, that He is the end of life, that
therefore both our individual and our social or political life
has a spiritual basis?
Knowing this, a man can find his place in the universe.
He can see how he is related to other beings, - that he is
essentially related to God as subject to supreme sovereign,
as agent to final end; that he is related to society as moral
part to moral whole; to other individuals as essentially and
juridically their equal, and to the physical world as to what
is for his use and enjoyment. This is the factual situation.
Reflecting upon, it, he can see what he ought to do, how, in
the face of facts, he ought to act, not indeed in every con-
tingency of life, but in all those basic matters that are
momentous in his life as a man. He reasons somewhat like
this: It is a fact that I am essentially dependent upon and
subject to my Creator. Therefore, I ought to acknowledge
His sovereignty, worship His majesty, do His known will.
It is a fact that society or the State is but a means which
men have instituted to further their common temporal.wel-
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fare. Therefore, though I am not a part of it, and should co-
operate with my fellows to promote the common welfare,
I am not a part of it in the sense that my whole personality
is or ever justly can be wholly submerged in or subordinated
to it. It is a fact that, despite the differences that obtain
among human beings, all have the same nature, the same
basic endowment, and so are all basically equal. There-
fore I ought to love my neighbor as myself; I have no au-
thority from nature over him, no right to injure him in his
person or his property. It is a fact that the physical world
is for my use and enjoyment. Therefore I ought to partake
of its bounty in such a way as to promote and not to in-
jure my bodily welfare. Finally, it is a fact that each of my
bodily powers, - senses, my various internal organs, my
intellect and my will has its own proper object, its own par-
ticular end. Therefore I should use them for no other pur-
pose than the attainment of those ends. It is these judgments
of reason, grounded in the factual situation that I have de-
scribed, that we understand by the term natural law, in the
sense of. moral law. It was to that law that the founders of
our democracy appealed in. the statement of their principles
and in their claim to the possession of inalienable rights.
Moral science, whether it be ethics proper, or politics or
law or sociology or economics, since it has to do with hu-
man actions, necessarily takes as its point of departure the
nature of man, his origin, destiny and relationship to other
beings. This is exactly what the founders did. They did not
say, as so many nowadays are saying, that man's ancestry
is purely animal, that as a citizen he is as literally a part of
the social organism, as the hand is of the body, and so en-
tirely subordinate to it, having no duties or rights except
such as may be imposed or conceded by the State and hav-
ing no higher destiny than to serve the State. They did not
say that man exists for the State. Quite the contrary, they
said that the State exists for man; for they maintained that
political sovereignty resides in the people.
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"To secure these rights," they said, "governments are in-
stituted among men deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed." The thought behind this state-
ment is that, as I have already said, the individual does not
exist for the State, but, contrariwise, the State exists for the
individual. The group exists for the good of the members;
it is subordinated to their interests, and justifies its existence
only so long as it promotes their interests. The personality of
an individual is inviolable. For he has a destiny superior to
temporal social life; he spontaneously seeks a perfection or
happiness which nothing temporal can wholly satisfy. And
yet by himself he cannot attain this perfection. The plain
fact is that all of us depend upon human society not only for
the necessities of life but also for the development of our
physical, intellectual and moral powers. It is for that reason
'that we say man is by nature a social being, that "he is
called by nature to live in society." Men therefore organize
society in order to attain their natural ends. Since men are
by nature social, nature, or if you wish, the author of nature,
must have endowed them with all the means necessary for
social living. They are therefore as a group the depositories
of supreme civil authority or sovereignty, without which so-
ciety is inconceivable. The people then are sovereign, not in
the contradictory sense of Rousseau or Hobbes, namely that
public authority consists of the sum total of liberties which
each individual was willing to give up on entering society,
but in the sense that they are the channels through which,
on the occasion of the need for electing their rulers, it flows
to the person or persons so chosen. Evidently, if men are
by nature equal, then no individual has any superiority over
another, a superiority which is implied by the term authority.
Moreover, there is another and more profound reason why
the individual has rights of which no State may deprive him.
It is because, as DeWulf puts it, "human personality alone is
a substantial reality. On the other hand, no group whatever,
the State included, is a real being; it is simply a group of
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persons." I In other words, the State is not an entity in itself
and so not an end in itself. It is but a collection, a grouping
of individuals. It has not an internal substantial unity, but
only an external and functional unity. It is only by analogy
that it can be called an organism. It has no reality apart
from the individuals that compose it.
This brings us to the third point, the right of the people
to select their magistrates, i. e. their rulers. The founders
held that "whenever any form of government becomes de-
structive of these ends (i. e. the common welfare of the peo-
ple) it is the right of "the people to alter or abolish it, and
to institute new government, laying its foundations on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."
Now this principle follows logically from their conception
of the sovereignty of the people. For they conceived of sover-
eignty, not an unlimited power, or one to be used to attain
any arbitrary end. They regarded it rather as a function or,
better still, an office or duty. It is a means to be employed by
those upon whom it has been bestowed to provide for the
safety and happiness of the people. That is its sole end, its
only reason for existence. When any government forgets
that or, what is worse, acts positively against it, it forfeits
the right to exercise sovereignty any longer. Since the state
is but an association of individuals, it follows that there is not
one set of rights and duties, one morality, for the ruled and
another for the rulers, but the same for both. Sovereignty
is for the association, for the preservation of its existence,
its unity, its solidarity, its peace and its progress toward the
common good. It is in fact upon the conception of social
solidarity that the common good is founded. For, to quote
De Wulf once more ' "Every good and virtuous act per-
formed by the individual man is capable of benefiting the
community, - the community in which he has membership,
1 De Wulf, PnmosoPmy AwD CimIznAo x THE MImDLE AGES, p. 230.
2 Id. at 246.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
as a part of the whole. Hence it follows that in the state,
the individual good can be referred always to the common
welfare; the scholar who teaches and studies, the monk who
prays and preaches, these render service to the community
as much as do the artisan and the farmer and the common
laborer."
All this is of course quite different from the ideas of the
contemporary promoters of the totalitarian State. For them
sovereignty does not belong to the people nor is it to be
exercised by them. It is the prerogative of a ruling party es-
tablished and maintained by military force and for the ends,
economic, military, cultural or religious which this party
decides should be attained. The rank and file have no voice
in governmental affairs. Their natural rights denied them,
their individual consciences are ignored. In a word, they
have neither political nor religious freedom.
Now, to take up our final point, the right of a people to
overthrow or to change and determine the form of govern-
ment. We may note that the founders regarded such a step
as a very serious one and not to be lightly taken, for "Pru-
dence, indeed, will dictate that governments long estab-
lished should not be changed for light and transient
causes . . . that mankind are more disposed to suffer while
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing
the forms to which they are accustomed."
In other words, they regarded human institutions in their
true light, that is, as at best imperfect and accompanied by
certain defects. They had a sane and healthy tolerance for
human shortcomings. They realized that it is always ex-
.remely difficult to successfully change habits of long stand-
ing and institutions to which a people has long become ac-
customed, and that it is always better to conserve these
habits and continue the institutions so long as popular rights
are not too violently disregarded.
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And yet, in spite of the prudence and forbearance which
they counselled under ordinary circumstances, they very
logically maintained that "when a long train .of abuses and
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a
design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their
right and duty, to throw off such government and to provide
new guards for their future security."
Though rebellion against tyranny is ever to be a last re-
sort, still they claimed that such rebellion was both a right
and a duty. It is a right because, when the exercise of sover-
eignty takes the form of an unjust aggression upon their
rights and liberties, every law, human and divine, sanctions
resistance to the unjust aggressor. And it is their duty be-
cause since sovereignty or supreme civil authority resides
in them, and it is to be used by them for the common good,
they owe it to themselves to withdraw it from their repre-
sentatives and place it in more worthy hands.
To sum up. The following propositions may be said to be
contained in the philosophy underlying our American De-
mocracy:
1. Men owe their origin to the creative act of God.
2. As they came from Him they are equal.
3. Being created by Him and for Him they have the duty
to live the life He gave them, to live it freely, that is,
without hindrance from any earthly power to employ
all necessary means to that end; and that end pos-
sessed is the full measure of human happiness.
4. Men are by nature social beings. Therefore they pos-
sess from nature all necessary means for social living.
Supreme authority or sovereignty is one of these.
Therefore it resides in the people. The people are
sovereign.
194 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
5. Therefore the State exists for them; not they for the
State.
6. Being sovereign, they obviously have the right to
choose their rulers and their form of government.
7. The end of government being their common welfare,
they have the right to depose unworthy rulers and to
select such as will exercise sovereignty for proper ends.
Rev. Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C.
University of Notre Dame.
